Abstract：Securities issuing supervision is very important to the securities market development, and information disclosure is the center of securities issuing supervision, so how to assure issuer disclose the true information becomes main object of supervisor. This paper established a game model of securities supervision between issuer and supervisor and analyzed their optimum strategy. Some advice was given to reduce information cheating level and promote issuer to disclose true information.
杨荣国,吴文锋. 基于博弈论的证券发行信息欺诈[J]. 上海交通大学学报（自然版）, .
YANG Rong-guo WU Wen-feng . A Game Model of Information Disclosure Cheating in Securities Issuing . J. Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.(Sci.) , 2008, 42(11): 1780-1783.
