Abstract：In order to study the value of information sharing, this paper considers a dualchannel supply chain that consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer holds his private information about his own valueadded cost in this supply chain system. The supply chain is modeled as a Stackelberg game. The impact of information sharing on the manufacturer and retailer’s equilibrium strategies and profits were analyzed and the value of information sharing to both the manufacturer and the retailer was investigated. It is found that the value of information sharing on the manufacturer is always positive, but this is not right for the retailer.
邹细兵，王丽亚. 双重销售渠道的供应链中的信息共享价值[J]. 上海交通大学学报（自然版）, .
ZOU Xi-bing,WANG Li-ya. The Value of Information Sharing in a Dualchannel Supply Chain. J. Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.(Sci.) , 2008, 42(11): 1839-1841.
