Introduction
A marine ISPs compliance game model
Fig. 1. The marine ISPs compliance game model 1. |
Fig. 2. The marine ISPs compliance game model 2. |
Journal of Ocean Engineering and Science >
Understanding the deterrence effect of punishment for marine information security policies non-compliance
Received date: 2022-05-27
Revised date: 2022-05-29
Accepted date: 2022-06-01
Online published: 2022-06-03
In the organizational setting of marine engineering, a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees' failure to comply with the information security policies (ISPs). This may be treated as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard between the employer and the employee for the practical compliance effort of an employee is not observable without high cost-. On the other hand, according to the deterrence theory, the employer and the employee are inherently self-interested beings.It is worth examining to what extent the employee is self-interested in the marine ISPs compliance context. Moreover, it is important to clarify the proper degree of severity of punishment in terms of the deterrent effect. In this study, a marine ISPs compliance game model has been proposed to evaluate the deterrence effect of punishment on the non-compliance behavior of employee individuals. It is found that in a non-punishment contract, the employee will decline to comply with the marine ISPs; but in a punishment contract, appropriate punishment will lead her to select the marine ISPs compliance effort level expected by the employer, and cause no potential backfire effect.
Xiaolong Wang , Changlin Wang , Tianyu Yi , Wenli Li . Understanding the deterrence effect of punishment for marine information security policies non-compliance[J]. Journal of Ocean Engineering and Science, 2024 , 9(1) : 9 -12 . DOI: 10.1016/j.joes.2022.06.001
Fig. 1. The marine ISPs compliance game model 1. |
Fig. 2. The marine ISPs compliance game model 2. |
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