当代外语研究 ›› 2014, Vol. 14 ›› Issue (06): 98-108.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-8921.2014.06.014

• 语言哲学 • 上一篇    下一篇

“意义”的含混:论罗素摹状词理论之无法剔除“涵义”

褚修伟   

  1. 西南大学,重庆,400715
  • 出版日期:2014-06-28 发布日期:2020-07-25
  • 作者简介:褚修伟,西南大学外国语学院副教授、博士。主要研究方向为语用学、语言哲学、认知语言学。电子邮箱:chuxw119@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    *教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“程式性言语事件研究”(编号10YJC740015)的阶段性成果。

The Confusion of “Meaning”: What Curtains Russell’s Failure to Reject Frege’s Sense

CHU Xiuwei   

  • Online:2014-06-28 Published:2020-07-25

摘要: 罗素在《论指谓》中宣称他的摹状词理论目标之一就是拒斥弗雷格的Sinn(涵义)和Bedeutung(指称)二分,剔除Sinn这一概念,坚持意义即指称的观点。然而,罗素用meaning(意义)来翻译弗雷格的Sinn,并在不同意义上混乱使用meaning一词,如,先说限定摹状词的意义可以从其构成词的意义看出,然后又结论性地说限定摹状词独立没有意义。罗素对meaning一词不审慎的使用,首先是直接导致了在重要论证中存在的一系列自相矛盾或纠缠不清,最根本的是它遮蔽了这样一个事实:罗素摹状词理论无法剔除弗雷格的“涵义”这一概念。厘清这一点,可以修正“罗素维护了意义即指称的看法”这一常见的不准确说法,从而更清楚地、更客观地认识罗素这一哲学典范之作的真正意义。

关键词: 摹状词理论, 意义, 涵义, 指称, 伪装了的涵义

Abstract: In On Denoting, Russell claims his theory of descriptions aims at rejecting Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, arguing against the existence of sense and thus advocating the view of meaning as reference. However, his translating Frege’s Sinn into “meaning” and further using the term in a variety of tangling senses lead to a series of confusion and even inconsistency in his account or argument for his theory, which to a large extent curtains the fact that his theory of descriptions fails to avoid Frege’s sense. This is in part reflected by his employing sense, sometimes disguised in the form of a kind of “meaning”, in reducing propositions that contain definite descriptions to logical forms that do not.

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