克里普克的通名指称理论试图论证通名是非摹状的,没有涵义的严格指示词,它的指称不是通过摹状词确定的而是由对象的本质特征即内部结构决定的,并经一根历史的因果链条传递下去。克里普克将自然种类通名与心理类型通名区分开,认为自然种类通名的同一性命题必然为真,而对心身同一性表示怀疑并持有一种新二元论立场。与传统观点不同,克里普克发现自然种类通名的同一命题是后验必然真而不是先验必然真,他的论证是通过其可能世界模态逻辑实现的。克里普克的本质主义哲学运思无疑是亚里士多德形而上学的语言重建。无论是心理类型通名还是自然种类通名,都能通过对同一性的辨证分析给出更合理的解释。

Kripke’s theory of general names attempts to prove that general names are rigid designators which lack descriptive content and have no sense. Their reference is fixed by the internal structure and passed down through casual chains. Kripke distinguishes natural kind names from mental type names. He discovers that the identical proposition of the former is Necessary A Posteriori Truth and the one of the latter is skeptical. He holds a new dualism position to the latter. Kripke’s argument is through his modal logic of possible world and his essential philosophy of language is undoubtedly the language reconstruction of Aristotle’s metaphysics. We hold that both natural kind names and mental type names can be explained by dialectically analyzing the identity.