知识语句的语境敏感性论题是当今实验语言哲学及实验知识论领域的核心论题之一。本研究采用问卷调查与访谈相结合的方法考察了知识语句的真值判断是否受语境因素影响,以及哪些因素会影响大众对知识归赋/否定之决策。我们随机选取了上海某八所高校的93名(硕士、博士)研究生进行问卷调查,问卷包括三组(共六个)不同语境的对照案例,然后用SPSS统计软件对数据进行了描述性统计和配对样本t检验。研究结果为知识语句的语境敏感性提供了部分佐证。问卷调查后我们又从中选取了十名被试进行了跟踪访谈,并基于访谈数据分析了影响知识语句使用的主要因素。
The context sensitivity of knowledge sentences has become one of the central topics in experimental philosophy (of language) and experimental epistemology. The present study aims to investigate whether the truth value judgments of knowledge sentences vary with context and which factor(s) may impact folk judgments about knowledge ascriptions/denials. Ninety three postgraduates from eight universities in Shanghai were randomly selected to participate in a questionnaire survey, which includes three pairs of contrastive cases (six in total). SPSS was run to produce the descriptive statistics and paired sample t tests. The findings have provided some evidence for the context sensitivity of knowledge sentences. After the survey a follow up interview was conducted with ten participants selected from the survey takers and the possible factors which may influence the use of knowledge sentences were finally analyzed with the help of our interview data.
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