道德断言最典型的特征是“表达”言者的道德态度。规约论者认为,道德态度的产生依赖于语言形式,道德断言中的态度触发语(如“好”、“对”或“错”等)能够指示自然特性或道德特性,从而直接或间接表达断言者的道德态度。会话论者则主张,道德态度源于话语“所含”,属于一般会话含义,且具有一般会话含义的基本特性。本文旨在阐明,规约论的论证方法和论证结果均有待商榷,因为它既无法明确界定自然特性,也不可能在阐明道德特性时不涉及会话含义;而会话论不但可以解释道德断言所具有的实践性,还为无道德论者是否持有道德态度这一难题提供了新的解答视角,因而更具优越性。
The typical characteristic of moral assertions is to “express”speakers' moral attitudes. Conventionalists claim that the producing of moral attitudes relies on the compositionality of moral assertions, because the attitude triggers (like “good”, “right” or “wrong”) can denote either natural or moral properties in virtue of which utterers' attitudes are manifested directly or indirectly. However, for conversationalists, moral attitudes are viewed as a sort of generalized conversational implicature (GCI), since moral attitudes stem from "what is implicated" in moral utterances and share basic features of GCI. Therefore, this paper aims to reveal that, in interpreting moral assertions, both the conventionalist methodologies and their resulting views are questionable for the reason that they can neither define the natural properties clearly nor expound the moral properties without involving conversational implicature. In contrast, conversationalist argumentation is preferable in that it not only explains the practicality of moral assertions but also provides a new resolution to the amoralist puzzle.
Barker, S. J. 2000. Is value content a component of conventional implicature? [J]. Analysis 60(3): 268-279.
Bar-On, D. & J. Sias. 2013. Varieties of Expressivism [J]. Philosophy Compass 8(8): 699-713.
Copp, D. 2001. Realist-expressivism: A neglected option for moral realism [J]. Social Philosophy and Policy Köhler 18:1-43.
Copp, D. 2009. Realist-expressivism and conventional implicature [A]. In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaethics [C]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 167-202.
Dunn, R. 2016. Values and the Reflective Point of View: on Expressivism, Self-knowledge and Agency [M]. London & New York: Routledge.
Finlay, S. 2004. The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement [J]. The Journal of Ethics (8): 205-223.
Finlay, S. 2005. Value and implicature [J]. Philosophers' Imprint (5): 1-20.
Fletcher, S.2014a.Hybrid views in meta-ethics: Pragmatic views [J]. Philosophy Compass 9 (12): 848-863.
Fletcher, S. 2014b. Moralutterances, attitude expression, and implicature [A]. In G. Fletcher & M. Ridge (eds.). Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories in Meta-Normative Theory [C]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 173-198.
Frege, G. 1892. On sense and reference [A]. In P. Geach & M. Black. (eds.). Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (2nd edition) [C]. Oxford: Blackwell. 56-78.
Grice, H. P. 1989. Logic and conversation [A]. In P. cole & J. Morgan (eds.). Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts [C]. New York: Academic Press. 41-58.
Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words [M]. MA: Harvard University Press.
Köhler, S. 2012. Expressivism, subjectivism and moral disagreement [J]. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1(1):71-78.
Sadock, J. M. 1991. On testing for conversational implicatures [A]. In S. Davis (ed.). Pragmatics: A Reader [C]. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 365-376.
Strandberg, C. 2012. A dual aspect account of moral language [J]. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.
