Abstract： The quality penalty is usually taken as a measure to stimulate the supplier to improve quality. In practice the quality improvement usually involves the supplier and the purchaser. In order to find the effect of aftersale quality loss on the decisionmaking on quality improvement, a game model of decisionmaking on quality improvement was proposed. It is found that the purchaser can not necessarily stimulate the investment of the supplier into the quality improvement by increasing the proportion of the aftersale quality loss to be borne by the supplier, and that the purchaser shall not make the supplier solely liable for the quality improvement. In choosing a supplier, the purchaser shall not only focus on the commitment of the supplier to assume certain proportion of the aftersale loss, but pay due attention to the preliminary quality status and the decisionmaking on quality improvement of the supplier.
张雄会，陈俊芳，黄培. 基于质量罚金的供应链成员质量改进决策[J]. 上海交通大学学报（自然版）, .
ZHANG Xiong-hui,CHEN Jun-fang,HUANG Pei . The DecisionMaking on Quality Improvement of SupplyChain Members Based on Quality Penalty. J. Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.(Sci.) , 2008, 42(11): 1859-1861.
