Abstract： The evolution of cooperation behaviors in the prisoner’s dilemma game on complex networks depends on the sufficient cooperators in the initial state. By introducing the incentive mechanism of human social organizations, this paper studied the evolution of cooperative behaviors in the prisoner’s dilemma game while a small amount cooperators exist in the initial state, and focus on the effect of incentive on the evolution of cooperative behaviors under the network structures constrains. First, an incentive condition on square lattice was theoretically analyzed. Under that condition, a single cooperator on square lattice can evolve to form the clusters of cooperators. Then, by using simulation, the effects of incentive mechanism on the evolution of cooperative behaviors were explored while a small amount of initial cooperators were randomly distributed on square lattice, regular small world network and heterogeneous network, respectively. The results show that incentive mechanism facilitates the evolution of cooperative behaviors in general. But on the square lattice and regular small world network, the incentive mechanism sometimes does not necessarily correspond to better cooperation status, and even has negative effect. These results have important inspiration on management practice.
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