语言是用来表达意向的。然而,当意向与价值变换发生关系时,人们会对同样的符号交际产生不同的意义解释。经实验观察,发现不同的人会把同一行为认定为“说谎”,或者“欺骗”,或“假装”。为什么会有这样的解释差异呢？对于这个问题,皮尔森的“普遍符号语义框架-2000”提供了相应的符号学阐释:同一交际事实中的意向行为存在着三种可能性判断:价值判断、真值判断和效用判断。从符号学阐释角度可以得出结论:“假装”不同于“说谎”和“欺骗”,因为假装接受的是效用判断,说谎接受的是真值判断,而欺骗接受的是价值判断。
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