The context sensitivity of knowledge sentences has become one of the central topics in experimental philosophy (of language) and experimental epistemology. The present study aims to investigate whether the truth value judgments of knowledge sentences vary with context and which factor(s) may impact folk judgments about knowledge ascriptions/denials. Ninety three postgraduates from eight universities in Shanghai were randomly selected to participate in a questionnaire survey, which includes three pairs of contrastive cases (six in total). SPSS was run to produce the descriptive statistics and paired sample t tests. The findings have provided some evidence for the context sensitivity of knowledge sentences. After the survey a follow up interview was conducted with ten participants selected from the survey takers and the possible factors which may influence the use of knowledge sentences were finally analyzed with the help of our interview data.
ZHOU Xiang, LIU Longgen
. Knowledge vs. Non Knowledge:An Empirical Study on the Context Sensitivity of Knowledge Sentences[J]. Contemporary Foreign Languages Studies, 2016
, 16(05)
: 32
-38
.
DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-8921.2016.05.003
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